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Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to study the policy impact the populist right has had on 
established actors in the French party system. To do so, it adopts a long-term perspective by 
looking at developments in immigration policies since the early 1970s. The paper generates a 
number of empirical measures to assess policy change and the partisan motivations 
underlying new legislations. The analysis demonstrates that policy inputs by parties of the 
right have been significantly more vulnerable to exogenous contagion effects by the FN. Left-
wing parties in contrast have not abdicated from their ideological preferences for expansive 
immigration policies. Lastly, whilst the findings suggest historical continuity in the politics of 
immigration control by the right since the mid-1970s, they point to significant policy and 
positional shifts in the area of immigrant integration, particularly after 2010. As a 
consequence, party polarization has dramatically increased. 
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The puzzle of the rise of right-wing populist parties in Western democracies has received a 
great deal of attention. There is a vast literature seeking to account for the electoral fortunes of 
those parties. In the last ten years research has devoted more effort to casting light on the 
reciprocity of the relationship between the populist right and its political environment 
(Minkenberg 2001, Rydgren 2005, Arzheimer and Carter 2006). With right-wing populists 
breaking through into elected office across a number of European countries, studies have also 
become gradually interested in reflecting on those parties’ performances in government 
(Heinisch 2003, Albertazzi and McDonnell 2010, Duncan 2010, Mazzoleni and Skenderovic 
2007). 
 
More recently, new questions have arisen around the issue of populist right impact on the 
other competitors in the party system. There is now a growing body of research on the 
strategic and programmatic responses articulated by parties of the mainstream in order to 
confront their new rivals (Garner 2005, Williams 2006, Zaslove 2006, Green-Pedersen and 
Krogstrup 2008, Bale et al. 2010). This scholarly work aims to address the key question of the 
contagion effect by right-wing populists on other parties’ policy positions (van Spanje 2010). 
 
A case study of the political impact by the Front national (FN) in France fits this research 
agenda. In France, mainstream parties have witnessed the growth and stabilization in the 
electoral support for the populist right since the mid-1980s. Whilst they have successfully 
managed to bar the FN from entering the arena of policy elaboration (Ivaldi 2007), the 
external political influence and nuisance power of right-wing populism have grown larger 
over the years. 
 
Policy impact hypotheses have been put forward. Bale (2008:457) suggests for example that 
“policy being a response to the far-right is probably most evident in France”. Restrictive and 
repressive policies introduced in the areas of immigration and law-and-order have been 
interpreted as a reaction by the moderate right to the electoral entrenchment of the FN within 
the party system (Schain 2006). To many observers, the swing has culminated under Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s leadership over the UMP right-wing coalition. Since 2006, immigration and law-
and-order have topped the French political agenda, and the UMP has been widely criticized 
for adopting the postures and policies of the populist right with a view to secure its electoral 
appeal to FN voters (Marthaler 2008). 
 
For those familiar with the public debates surrounding each of the many dramatic episodes 
that have punctuated the electoral advent of the populist right in France, the recurrence of 
those themes is notorious. Whilst there seems to be a large consensus about the fact that the 
FN has exerted significant influence on other parties in the political system, there has been 
little effort on the other hand to provide empirical evidence for such assumptions of 
ideological pervasiveness and policy shifts to the right. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is therefore to put the ‘policy contagion’ argument under more 
meticulous scrutiny. It sets out to examine whether claims of political impact by the FN can 
be sustained in a systematic empirical way and, if the case, which indicators of populist right 
contamination can be resorted to within the framework of a national case-study. To try answer 
those questions, this contribution adopts a long-term perspective by looking at developments 
in immigration policies in particular since the early 1970s and the extent to which these can 
be viewed as corollary to the exogenous influence by the FN. 
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To this end, the paper generates original data to document policy changes across time. These 
are complemented with a quantitative analysis of the political framing of immigration policy 
preferences and the partisan motivations underlying new policy inputs. 
 
 
Evaluating populist right impact: issues, venues and actors 
 
When trying to assess policy contagion effects exerted by the populist right, a first question to 
ask is that of the perimeter in which to perform the search. On the supply-side of electoral 
politics, the surge in popularity of right-wing populist parties has brought new cultural issues 
to the forefront of the West European electoral agenda (Kitschelt 1995, Ignazi 2003). In 
France, the political agenda marked out by the populist right is one that typically amalgamates 
nationalist exclusionism and socio-cultural authoritarianism as its ultimate ideological 
features. Immigration and crime in particular have traditionally formed a typical set of salient 
issues for the FN both at party and mass level. If one should probably not overlook the role of 
some of the other lines of conflict that structure political competition in France 1, the 
‘cultural’ axis arguably constitutes a focal domain where to look for impact by the populist 
right. 
 
Within it, opposition to immigration is the most publicized issue. Over the years, the FN has 
framed multifaceted public concerns about immigration in the competitive space. The 
nationalist immigration platform of the party reaches far beyond immigration control to 
encompass cultural protectionism, an exclusive citizenry and the promotion of welfare 
chauvinist policies. These form part of the ‘nativist’ agenda that is constitutive of the new 
right-wing populist parties’ core ethno-pluralist ideology and electoral appeal to voters (Betz 
and Johnson 2004, Mudde 2007). 
 
Our research compass being set to this particular cluster of issues, a second question that 
precedes the empirical work is that of venues of party competition where to look for influence 
by the populist right. In this contribution, the scope for analysis is set to substantive policy 
making and executive actions. This shift in emphasis is dictated by the need to reflect on the 
(dis)continuous process in possible contagion effects. Whilst national elections represent 
critical moments in the programmatic activity by political parties, more attention needs 
perhaps to be devoted to what happens during the interval in mass public opinion or second-
order elections. Assuming fluctuating populist pressure, new policy targets may well be 
defined during legislatures and these might represent significant departures from the 
preferences articulated in party platforms during the electoral campaign. 
 
The ‘real-life’ policy examination that is proposed here aims thereby to complement studies 
of party competition and programmatic change (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2008, Bornschier 2010, Van 
der Brug and Van Spanje 2009) and can be deemed an effort to enrich the scholarly works 
that strive to narrow the gap between the fields of policy and party politics (Triadafilopoulos 
and Zaslove 2006, Statham and Geddes 2007, Gudbrandsen 2010). 
 
This focus on the legislative arena allows to explore the behavior of partisan actors in 
enacting substantive policy choices, and the political discourse surrounding policy innovation. 
This brings us to the third and last opening question, which relates to the political actors 
involved in the contagion effect by the populist right. Parties of the conservative right are 
likely to be more vulnerable to such pressure (Norris 2005). In the French case, it is not over-
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exaggerated to say that the right has spent over two decades trying to recapture the vote lost to 
the FN (Shields 2010). It is often argued that, as a consequence of the contamination of 
political discourses by the populist right’s themes, the center of gravity of the whole French 
party system has moved to the right. 
 
Crossing over to the other side of the political spectrum, the French left itself has not proved 
totally immune to the electoral success of the FN. A dire reminder of this political reality 
came in the dramatic episode of 21st April 2002, which saw the elimination of socialist 
candidate Jospin in the first round of the presidential election. More decisively, parties of the 
left have been affected by the dealignment process in their traditional blue-collar 
constituency, and the mass desertion to the FN by working-class voters since the late 1980s 
(Perrineau 2009). A wider angle is therefore needed to examine the extent to which the 
contagion impact of right-wing populism concerns the party system as a whole. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
The analysis presented here is threefold and begins with the measurement of policy salience. 
A first indication of impact is that of the FN’s influence on policy agenda formation. The 
study of immigration policy developments needs to be incorporated in the more general 
framework that takes account of the specific combinatory in the mobilisatory appeal by the 
populist right. It is therefore important to place immigration policies in the more general 
context of legislation change on issues of law-and-order and cultural liberalism to better 
evaluate the trajectories of the successive French governments, and the extent to which their 
policy programs might have moved closer to the core constitutive elements of the FN agenda. 
 
A similar way of reasoning applies to the examination of the alterations and adjustments that 
have been made to immigration policies in particular. The claim that mainstream parties have 
undergone a rightward shift and espoused more restrictive immigration policies is common in 
the literature (e.g. Harmel and Svasand 1997, Norris 2005). Yet the sole notion of 
restrictiveness is too vague to approximate populist right impact. If the objective is to 
establish the extent to which the main ideological features of right-wing populism have 
penetrated mainstream policy preferences, then it might be necessary to disentangle those 
policies and seek differential effects across various domains of the legislative activity on 
immigration. 
 
Lastly, one third area of interest is that of evaluating frameworks of policy revision. These can 
be uncovered by the discursive universes and strategies by political actors in the course of 
elaborating new policies. Together with the ‘hard evidence’ of legislation implementation, it 
is important to look at partisan motivations and elite-level conflicts underlying policy inputs, 
as well as the internal and external sources of incentive for legislative change. If one agrees 
with Vink (2010:42) that parliamentary debates are ‘residuals of wider societal debates’, then 
there is a strong case for looking at policy preferences and the ideological polarization 
revealed in the positioning by partisan actors in the parliamentary arena. 
 
It is too often assumed that opportunistic parties of the moderate right go fish for the populist 
vote by simply copy-catting the positions of their populist challengers. More attention should 
be devoted to the transformative process by which those issues are transported into 
mainstream policy development (Messina 2007, Bale 2003). A focus on parliamentary 
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debates permits the assessment of how established parties attempt to gain control of and 
(re)frame issues politicized by the populist right, within the boundaries imposed by 
imperatives of intra-party competition, programmatic acceptability and, increasingly so, a 
common European policy framework. 
 
Europeanization comes of course as a matter of crucial importance to the understanding of the 
framing of immigration issues by political elites. Since the mid-1990s, immigration as a 
policy domain has moved further away from the control of national governments. The 
European context in which national parties operate can hardly be ignored. Nor can we 
overlook the development of a common European immigration policy framework and the 
consequent standardization that has occurred in national models (Joppke 2007, Duncan and 
Van Hecke 2008, Luedtke 2010). As will be discussed, this presupposes that the analysis of 
debates in the parliamentary arena controls for EU-related factors but also reflects on how 
European issues are mobilized as strategic discursive resources by national politicians. 
 
 
Methods and data 
 
The paper adopts a national case-study perspective and aims to develop empirical measures 
for a systematic comparison of immigration policies over time. Given the already long history 
of the FN since its first electoral breakthrough in 1983/84, it is necessary to trace impact back 
to the early 1970s. It is generally accepted that the politicization of immigration and its 
incorporation into the framework for executive and legislative action began in the late 1960s 
in France (Weil 1991). 
 
The selection of extensive time series measures covering nearly four decades provides a 
comprehensive portrait of France’s immigration policies. It supplies the amount of party-
based and time-related variance that is required to address the role of partisanship in policy 
making, and eventually help place the recent evolution of the mainstream right in historical 
perspective. Using the same methodological criteria allows track of change and continuity 
within a given legislature. It also helps compare pre-and-post FN emergence phases, which 
can be seen as one way of building empirically upon the counterfactual argument that some of 
the trends that have been observed in French immigration policies originated in the period that 
preceded the electoral upsurge of the populist right. 
 
The first part of the analysis is concerned with the degree of autonomy of immigration as a 
distinct policy domain within the more general ‘libertarian-authoritarian’ agenda. It starts by a 
quantitative assessment of policy salience defined as the amount of legislation devoted to 
specific policy areas within the legislative process as a whole. The focus is on laws pertaining 
to immigration, law-and-order or security and, more generally, to the core orientations of a 
cultural libertarian agenda that comes into opposition with the traditional social-authoritarian 
stances of the FN. The latter category covers a range of policies as diverse as gender equality, 
civil rights and individual liberties, the recognition of minorities and fight against 
discriminations, measures against social exclusion or racism, which all form part of the 
cultural liberalization process that was initiated in the 1970s. 
 
These make up a total set of 2,162 parliamentary laws from May 1974 to May 2011 available 
to a policy domain analysis 2. Partisanship is taken from the make up of parliamentary 
majorities in each successive legislature (Vth to XIIIth). Political orientations (left/right) are 
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derived accordingly. It must be noted here that the analysis concerns exclusively 
parliamentary acts that have been adopted and put into force. Abandoned pieces of legislation, 
amendments rejected during parliamentary sessions or controversial provisions censored by 
the Constitutional Council are excluded from the analysis. Given their significance, extensive 
accounts of these are found of course in the data on parliamentary debates. 
 
In the second part of the analysis, the focus is more specifically on the subset of immigration 
policies with a view to measure empirically the direction taken in certain key areas over a 
similar time span. Policy is taken here in a broader sense including all parliamentary acts as 
well as administrative rulings (i.e. governmental decrees, ordonnances and circulars), the 
latter being of particular significance to the government’s autonomous regulatory power under 
the provisions of the French constitution (art. 34 & 37). 
 
The operationalization builds upon and aims to expand the work by Givens and Luedtke 
(2005) in their comparative study of European immigration policies. The authors suggest to 
differentiate between two areas of ‘immigration control’ and ‘immigrant integration’ (p.3). 
Here policy is divided into three main types: immigration control, immigrant integration and 
labour immigration, which can be broken down into the following policy areas: 
 
- Immigration control: illegal immigration, political asylum and refugees, visas, border 
control, detention, student permits 
- Immigrant integration: citizenship, family reunion, marriage, residency requirements, 
anti-discrimination 
- Labour immigration: legal labour immigration, work permits 
 
This deviates from earlier classifications on two important accounts. First, policy relating to 
family reunification is put under ‘immigrant integration’ as it pertains to the rights of people 
who are already legally settled in France. Second, it seems preferable to specify labour 
immigration as a third category distinct from the control dimension. Again a strong rationale 
for this is found in the reality of French immigration policies which have traditionally 
singularized economic migration, even more so in the recent period. In fine these three types 
correspond more closely with the general framing of the political debate on immigration and 
its legislative translation in France. 
 
The coding is done for each individual provision contained in the pieces of legislation 
included in the analysis. This choice is dictated by the recent evolution of immigration policy 
making whereby legislation has become increasingly complex. Policies are not of one piece 
and it is often the case that a particular bill contains a package of measures going in opposite 
directions across different areas. Additionally it is important to take into account the 
interconnection that exists between different policy domains, mostly in the area of immigrant 
integration where provisions scatter across employment, social cohesion, healthcare or 
education laws. Conversely, some measures to tighten immigration control must be sought in 
security bills. 
 
This second data set includes all legislative and regulatory provisions pertaining to 
immigration from 1974 to May 2011, which add up to a total of 715. The latter cases 
represent of course only a small part of the vast body of legislative acts and administrative 
rulings that exist in France. In particular, the analysis leaves out a large number of ‘technical’ 
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secondary application decrees as well as the many administrative decisions dealing with 
remit, competences or civil servant nominations, where no particular trend is discernable. To 
avoid duplication, case selection also takes into account the existing hierarchy of 
administrative norms, whereby similar provisions can be found in decrees and their subsidiary 
rulings. A provision that spreads across several articles of a same bill or ruling is only coded 
once. On the contrary, articles that contain two provisions or more are disaggregated and 
coded accordingly. 
 
Each of these provisions is coded in terms of its direction towards more liberalization / 
expansiveness (+1) or control / restrictiveness (-1). This implies that no particular assumption 
is made regarding the symbolic or emotional impact of the provisions considered for analysis. 
It should also be noted that the coding of policy change is mostly relative rather than absolute, 
and therefore differs from studies that aim to contrast French immigration policies against 
international benchmarks (Givens and Luedtke 2005, Bauböck et al. 2006, Howard 2010). In 
the vast majority of cases, provisions are compared to those already contained in the existing 
domestic legislation in terms of their downgrading or upgrading previously established 
standards. This is largely facilitated by the fact that most legislative modifications have been 
made to the reference Ordonnance of 2 November 1945 through successive amendments and 
repeals by parliamentary majorities of both the left and right since the late 1970s. 
 
Whereas there are few coding problems on the ‘control’ dimension, there is some uncertainty 
as to how to process some policy provisions on immigrant integration and labour. Considering 
the Republican model of universalistic cultural assimilation that has historically prevailed in 
France, attribution of a clear direction to some civic integration policy aspects is sometimes 
more problematic. The 2010 bill that banned the Islamic face veil (niqab) from public places 
is one clear instance of such ambiguity. Whilst a possible ‘assimiliationist’ bias cannot be 
ignored, the choice was made to penalise coercive civic integration policies and therefore 
code as restrictive (-1) all provisions that would place most of the responsibility for 
assimilation on the immigrant alone. This was the case for instance for ‘civic integration’ 
requirements such as obligatory language, history or civic tests, as well as for provisions such 
as those contained in the anti-Niqab bill. 
 
Similarly, there are some problems associated with coding sanctions against employers of 
illegal immigrants. In that case multiple inference is required, which leads to processing those 
particular sets of measures across two dimensions. On the one hand, provisions to crack down 
on companies that employ undocumented workers are restrictive on the control dimension 
insofar as they participate of the fight against illegal immigration. On the other hand, these 
can simultaneously be viewed as expansive on the labour dimension on the account that they 
could possibly lead to greater recognition –legalization– of illegal workers with regard to their 
contribution to the national economy. 
 
The third and last data set that is envisaged here is drawn from a systematic analysis of 
parliamentary debates on immigration. The focus is on the party elite discursive constructions 
that accompany the development of legislation, as well as the make up and structure of 
partisan competition over those issues. This part of the study is based upon quantitative 
relational content analysis (Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001). A method applicable to a 
wide range of political texts, quantitative relational content analysis is designed to code 
relations between ‘political objects’. It measures actors’ positioning in a public debate as well 
as the overall level of partisan polarization that exists in it. 
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The basic unit for analysis is the core sentence which, in the present case, is obtained from 
disaggregating public statements made by French MPs and Ministers during parliamentary 
debates over immigration bills. The focus is on relations between political actors (actor – 
actor – issue sentences) –most particularly of course cases where speakers from the opposition 
comment upon provisions contained in the draft bill by the government–, and relations 
between actors and issues. The relationship between the two objects is measured 
quantitatively using a five-point scale from -1 to +1 with intermediary positions (-.5, 0 and 
+.5), where a negative sign indicates criticism or rejection, as opposed to support or positive 
appraisal. Combined with the above actor/issue dichotomy, the directional measure enables 
the analysis to evaluate polarization in both its relational and ideological forms. 
 
Given the objective to reflect on how some of the issues politicized by the populist right are 
transported into mainstream policy making, the coding of political issues is designed to 
encompass a reasonably large number of individual categories which in turn can be grouped 
into main domains for the purpose of comparison over time. With regard to the political 
affiliation of actors, speakers are considered at party level and, where appropriate, according 
to their belonging to well identified party factions. These can be further aggregated in terms 
of parliamentary groups of the majority and the opposition, which in the context of France’s 
majoritarian system overlaps with the left/right axis. 
 
Drawing on the work by Dolezal et. al (2010) on the cross-national analysis of public debates 
over Islam, core sentences are also coded in terms of frames defined as ‘patterns of 
justification’ (p.179). The authors suggest to differentiate between three main types of frame: 
pragmatic, identity-based and moral-universal. The first type refers to arguments based upon 
pragmatic evaluations in terms of efficiency or cost-benefits with no particular normative 
judgment associated. Identity-based frames point to values that are peculiar of a community 
or a political camp. Conversely, moral-universal arguments relate to universal principles of 
justice and rights which are independent of established political cleavages. To be applicable to 
parliamentary debates, two additional types need to be considered: first a report-statistics 
category which refers to instances where the argument is based on statistics, reports or 
international comparison; second a type of ‘legal’ argument which is often used and relates to 
existing national legislation, international treaties or case law. 
 
Lastly, it is important to place parliamentary discussions in the context of the development of 
a common immigration policy framework at EU level. A dummy ‘EU-related’ variable is 
therefore used to distinguish statements where a clear reference is made to European 
institutions –most obviously in cases of implementing European directives in national 
legislation– from those relating to strictly domestic aspects in the debate. 
 
The data are drawn from records of parliamentary readings of immigration bills by the 
National Assembly, which are published in extenso in the Journal Officiel (French Gazette). 
All sections of the debates are considered for the analysis including preliminary general 
discussions, statements of motives, discussion of individual articles and amendments, as well 
as explanations of votes where appropriate. 
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This last data set is part of what should make a broader research project on French 
immigration policies. The analysis presented here is restricted to preliminary findings from 
the 1980 and 2011 government bills on immigration. In a way these represent the two ends of 
the temporal continuum, and therefore contribute to a first –incomplete– derivation of 
elements of continuity and change in the political framing of immigration policy in France 3. 
 
 
Results 
 
This first part is concerned with degrees of policy salience. It draws from the analysis of the 
legislative trajectories followed by successive French governments in the areas of 
immigration, law-and-order and cultural liberalism since the early 1970s. Table 1 below 
presents a summary of the amount of legislation concerned with those three policy areas in 
each of the French legislatures since 1974. Given the variability in the lifespan of 
parliamentary majorities –from 82 months under Giscard’s presidency between 1974 and 
1981 down to only 25 months during the first period of cohabitation in 1986/88–, the salience 
of each policy domain is expressed as a percentage of the total number of laws passed during 
the legislature 4. 
 
As revealed in Table 1, immigration as a political issue has been on the French legislative 
agenda since the early 1970s. The results first remind us that there never was in France any 
‘conspiracy of silence’ nor dismissive strategies by established political parties. Rather, there 
has been a common recognition by both the left and the right of the need to produce policies 
to address the presence of already well established immigrants on French soil as well as to set 
rules for the admission of newcomers. Overall, left and right have very similar shares of 
immigration laws (of about 1.8 per cent), notwithstanding the differences that might exist in 
their policy preferences, and which will be examined in the second part of the analysis. 
 
 
[ Table 1 Here ] 
 
 
If we look for immigration policy impact, then the first post-FN emergence right-wing 
government of Jacques Chirac in 1986 does not significantly depart from this general pattern 
and shows no actual tendency towards legislative inflation in this particular area. This holds 
true even when taking into account the aborted most controversial bill on nationality that the 
RPR/UDF coalition tried to put forward during their first time of coming back into office after 
the 1981 alternation to the left. The policy salience of immigration sees its first significant 
increase in the second Mitterrand presidency. With the exception of the Jospin left-wing 
government between 1997 and 2002, immigration laws represent a stable proportion of 
legislation from 1988 onwards, with a peak observed under Chirac’s second term between 
2002 and 2007. Placed in historical perspective, the relative amount of immigration acts under 
Sarkozy is not dissimilar to that of his right-wing predecessors. 
 
Differences between the left and the right are more pronounced with respect to their 
propensity to legislate in the domain of law-and-order. Across the whole period, the relative 
amount of security laws by right-wing governments is twice that of their left counterparts (2.9 
as opposed 1.4 per cent). Unlike immigration, law-and-order issues gained legislative 
prominence in 1986-1988 during the first cohabitation, immediately after the FN made its 
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appearance on the forefront of the French political stage. When juxtaposed to the dearth of 
legislation in this area up to the mid-1980s, the abundance (5.6 per cent) of security-related 
bills during the short period of right-wing incumbency between 1986 and 1988 provides 
stronger empirical support to the ‘policy reaction’ hypothesis. 
 
Contrary to the general assumption of intense law-and-order legislative activity by Sarkozy in 
his role as Minister of Interior, and despite the salience of criminality issues in the 2002 
presidential campaign, the second Chirac presidency does not stand out as devoting greater 
attention to security matters than had been the case under the previous right-wing 
governments of 1986 and 1993. With respect to law-and-order, the acceleration in the 
legislative process is clearly more pronounced during the first four years of Sarkozy’s term as 
president, with a total of twelve security bills making up 5.8 % of all legislative texts adopted 
since 2007, a proportion similar to that found in 1986-1988. 
 
A perhaps clearer picture emerges in the amalgamation of immigration and security issues, 
which is most typical of the programmatic appeal by the populist right. Irrespective of the 
partisan making of parliamentary majorities, controlling for pre-and-post FN emergence 
period indicates that the amount of legislative work devoted to immigration and criminality 
has grown larger in size and come to occupy more space in the parliamentary arena after 1986 
(from 1.5 up to 5.7 per cent of all legislative bills). 
 
This is particularly true of parties on the right side of the political spectrum. All post-1986 
right-wing governments are found to have a significantly higher contingent of laws addressing 
the FN proprietary issues of immigration and crime, fluctuating around an average of 6 per 
cent of all legislative acts. This compares with 3.1 per cent across all left-wing governments. 
The amount of legislation devoted to those two constitutive dimensions of the populist right 
agenda stands also in striking contrast with the pattern of legislative action found under the 
Giscard presidency where the combination of immigration and security policies represented 
only a marginal 1.2 per cent share of all laws adopted between 1974 and 1981. Commensurate 
with the assumption that the UMP has moved further to the right under Sarkozy’s leadership, 
the FN agenda has had the highest level of legislative salience since 2007 with no less than 17 
laws representing 8.2 per cent of all bills adopted in parliament. 
 
Thus, there is a substantial increase in the legislative weight of populist right issues in the 
legislative work by the moderate right after 1986, which has culminated in the most recent 
period. The significance of this shift in policy focus to the overall process of transformation of 
the French legislative agenda is further informed by looking at concomitant developments in 
the third and last area of cultural liberalism since the early 1970s. 
 
Not surprisingly, this area differentiates more dramatically between the left and the right. One 
practical reason for this is that a clearer ideological direction assumption is inherent in the 
process of selecting this last set of laws. Here the singularity of the Jospin left-wing 
government is truly remarkable and ought to be highlighted. The analysis of legislative bills 
introduced between 1997 and 2002 points to over thirty laws of cultural liberalization (14 per 
cent), with a strong focus on equality policies in the employment and gender-based violence 
fields, by far the largest proportion across all French governments since the early 1970s. 
 
That the Greens were part of the ‘plural left’ parliamentary majority supporting the Jospin 
government is one explanation for the exceptional policy salience of the libertarian agenda. 
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The intensity in the legislative effort devoted to cultural issues must also be connected with 
the Europeanization process and the development of anti-discrimination and equal rights 
policy initiatives at EU level. For example, the 2001 law on the fight against discrimination 
was a translation into French legislation of important provisions contained in both the 
Amsterdam Treaty and the 2000 European Racial Equality Directive. 
 
This said, and in sharp contrast to this ‘new left’ policy agenda characteristic of the Jospin 
era, the right-wing governments of Chirac (1986-88) and Balladur/Juppé (1993-97) in 
particular are characterized by their paucity of cultural liberalization or equal rights 
legislation. It is noteworthy that the results for the Giscard presidency point to a much more 
equilibrated effort in promoting cultural and family modernization laws throughout the 1970s 
–of which the most emblematic probably were the 1975 and 1979 Veil laws on liberalizing 
the right to abortion. 
 
This declining importance of issues of cultural modernization in the legislative record of the 
moderate right immediately after 1986 can be seen as another indication of the reshaping of 
policy priorities entailed by the need to formulate a swift response to the upsurge of the FN. 
With respect to this last dimension, it is important to note that this deficit in cultural 
liberalization policies has been waning in the more recent period of right-wing incumbency. 
Beginning with the Chirac presidency in 2002 and further accentuated under Sarkozy’s since 
2007, there has been a trend towards a progressive reincorporation of culturally liberal policy 
initiatives, whose justification is also to be found in some of the constraints exerted by EU 
regulations on domestic public policy 5. 
 
The above analysis of immigration policy activity and elite-level salience in the context of 
other important domains within the ‘cultural divide’ ought of course to be complemented with 
an examination of the direction taken by the successive French governments over time. The 
politicization of immigration by the FN is not restricted to the sole area of control but 
encompasses clusters of issue positions in relation to immigrant integration, competition in 
the labour market or access to welfare. To better evaluate the impact of the populist right on 
mainstream immigration policy profiles, one must therefore disentangle immigration 
provisions. 
 
The results for the longitudinal analysis of immigration policy provisions implemented over 
the 1974-2011 time span are summarized in Table 2. For the reasons discussed above, all 
legislative and regulatory measures have been grouped into three main types of immigration 
control, immigrant integration and labour immigration, and their direction coded either 
restrictive (-1) or expansive (+1) with regard to changes made to existing legislative 
standards. The average direction is taken over all measures introduced by each successive 
legislature. 
 
 
[ Table 2 Here ] 
 
 
Over the whole 1974-2011 period, France’s immigration policies can be best defined by their 
skewness towards the restrictive pole on the control dimension (mean of -.46) and a leaning in 
favour of more expansive policies in the area of immigrant integration (.36). These two policy 
domains make up 43.9 and 38.8 per cent of all provisions respectively. Because of its smaller 
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size (17.3 per cent), labour migration legislation displays less clearly discernible trends. Yet, 
with the notable exception of Giscard’s presidency, wherever efforts were made to legislate, 
these were predominantly oriented towards encouraging –or at the very least organizing– 
labour immigration rather than stopping it. 
 
As was anticipated, partisanship contributes a great deal to shaping French immigration policy 
positioning over time. If a contagion effect by the FN is to be sought, then it is clear that it 
will vary in nature and size according to the partisan making of parliamentary majorities. 
Discrepancies are particularly striking in the area of immigrant integration where left-wing 
governments show a highly positive score (.88 as opposed to .06 for the right), and that of 
immigration control where governments of the moderate right stand out as significantly more 
restrictive in their policy making (-.64 compared with .10 for the left). 
 
Beginning with the left, there is a high level of policy consistency in the area of immigrant 
integration across the whole period, with highly positive average scores and no substantial 
variation when controlling for pre-and-post FN emergence. That the French left has been able 
to sustain expansive immigrant integration policies confirms some of the conclusions that 
were made earlier regarding the more general agenda for cultural liberalization put forward 
since its first coming into office in the early 1980s. It is significant that 31.5 per cent of all 
immigration policy provisions implemented by the left during its three intervals in power 
were drawn from other legislative domains such as employment, social cohesion, healthcare 
or education laws (compared with only 8.6 per cent for the right). 
 
A slightly more nuanced picture emerges from the analysis of control policies. Whilst 
expansive legislation was introduced during the first Mitterrand presidency (average score of 
.33), there was a notable displacement towards less generous measures after his re-election in 
1988 (-.21). That this correction coincided with the rise of the FN is commensurate with the 
general ‘policy reaction’ thesis. It is also consistent with the argument that the French left had 
somehow to respond to a mass desertion to the far right by its former working-class voters in 
the first round of the 1988 presidential election. Significantly their response was restricted to 
the sole area of immigration control thereby preserving programmatic and ideological 
coherence in the defence of immigrant integration. Additionally, the post-1988 turn in control 
policies must be placed in the context of the minority government led by the socialists during 
the IXth legislature and the need to seek alliance with some of the centrist factions in 
parliament. 
 
By way of contrast, the partisan make up of the alliance of socialists, radicals, greens and 
communists in the 1997 Jospin government translated into significantly more open 
immigration control policies (.43). One interesting finding that singularizes the ‘plural left’ 
experience of immigration legislation is that of the discrepancy found between highly 
expansive legislative provisions (1.0) and more restrictive administrative rulings (-.20) in the 
area of control. A similar deduction applies to the few measures that were taken to adapt 
migrations to the labour market, which were all introduced by the means of regulatory power. 
 
Turning to parties of the moderate right, one first important conclusion to be drawn from the 
data is that of historical continuity in immigration control policies pursued since the early 
1970s. The politics of control was already well in place under the Giscard presidency, in the 
absence of substantial electoral threat from the populist right. These empirical findings are 
consistent with qualitative analyses conducted by historians of immigration in France (Gastaut 
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2004, Spire 2005, Noiriel 2007).The data provide therefore limited empirical support to a 
general ‘policy contamination’ hypothesis, with similar mean scores across the pre-and post 
FN emergence periods (both at -.64). On the contrary, they demonstrate that immigration 
control policies had moved towards a more rigorous stance long before the FN had made its 
first appearance. Moreover, the findings suggest that this rightward shift in immigration 
control during the 1970s concerned predominantly the normative legislative arena where 
restrictiveness was even more pronounced (-.71 as opposed to -.50 in regulatory measures). 
Severe control policies were thereby highly publicized and given symbolic significance, 
rather than concealed behind less visible administrative rulings. 
 
These results do not entirely rule out the ‘policy response’ hypothesis however. Established 
parties of the right have not been immobile. The most stringent immigration control policies 
are indeed found in the 1986 right-wing government led by Jacques Chirac (-1.0). This 
accentuation coincides with both the electoral breakthrough of the FN and the short-lived 
experience of the populist right in French parliament between 1986 and 1988, consecutive to 
the change to a PR-based electoral system in 1985. This policy movement persists in 1993-
1997 albeit less markedly (-.78). In both cases, there is a very clear tendency towards 
strengthening the existing legislation, which, in the case of the Balladur and Juppé 
governments of 1993 and 1995, is complemented with a generous amount of highly restrictive 
decrees or circulars (-1.0). 
 
A more substantial negative repositioning is found is the area of immigrant integration where 
the policy impact by the FN is more visible. Whilst right-wing policy changes were in favour 
of integrating migrants into French society up to the early 1980s, they then evolved towards 
more obligatory trends once the FN had set foot on the political stage (from .55 in 1974-1981 
down to -.01 over the post-1986 period). The highest level of polarization on this second 
dimension is found during the 1993-1997 period where firmer control legislation is associated 
with a marked shift towards cultural assimilationist policies (-.47). Over the whole period 
covered here, the governments of Balladur and Juppé distinguish themselves from all other 
right-wing incumbents by this particular combination of strict control and harsh civic 
integration policies. 
 
To elaborate, what is discernible in our empirical results is a two-stage response by the 
moderate right to the electoral ascent of the FN. In 1986, the strategic calculations by the 
RPR/UDF coalition concerned immigration control essentially, and led to an accentuation of 
the already on-going trend towards restrictiveness that had been inaugurated by the centre-
right in the mid-1970s. In contrast, the 1993-1997 period of right-wing incumbency can be 
interpreted as an attempt to pre-empt further the FN political agenda by articulating drastic 
policy changes across both the control and immigrant integration dimensions. 
 
What about the more recent evolution by the moderate right? One important contribution by 
this analysis is to provide an empirical basis for comparison over time. Before we turn to 
examining the development of immigration policies since 2002, let us note that the findings 
show no significant differences between the two phases of right-wing government under the 
Chirac and Sarkozy presidencies. Very similar mean scores are found on each of the three 
dimensions under scrutiny. This stresses the permanence in policy preferences across both 
periods of incumbency, and corroborates the central role played by Sarkozy in modelling 
France’s immigration policies during his time as Minister of Interior between 2002 and 2007. 
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This said, time series analysis helps re-evaluate claims of a marked shift to the right in 
immigration policies over the more recent period. Whilst Sarkozy’s policies point to the 
continued overwhelming dominance of the politics of control that has been common to all 
right-wing governments since the mid-1970s, it must be noted however that the directional 
scores of the moderate right for 2002-2007 and subsequently (-.56 and -.52 respectively) 
remain lower than those observed in 1986 or 1993 and, to a lesser extent, that of the Giscard 
presidency between 1974 and 1981. That more drastic policy provisions are found in the 
legislative area (-.64) compared with administrative rulings (-.47) might reveal conflicting 
strategies by the mainstream right. On the one hand, legislation is employed as a highly 
symbolic political device to send a message of firmness to the public. On the other hand, the 
making of everyday policy through regulatory power uncovers the need for a slightly more 
pragmatic approach to immigration control. 
 
Pragmatism undoubtedly dominates the area of labour migration where Sarkozy’s personal 
input is more evident. As was briefly discussed earlier, a positive attitude towards effective 
labour migration management emerges from our data as a constant of immigration policies in 
France since the early 1980s, the only significant departure from this model being found 
during the Giscard presidency 6. This calls into question the FN policy contagion effect 
hypothesis. The recognition by all mainstream parties of the continuing need for foreign 
workforce comes in sharp opposition with the broad welfare chauvinist agenda of the populist 
right, which in the French case is best resumed in the FN most cherished ‘national preference’ 
scheme and traditional ‘zero immigration’ claim. 
 
The pursuit of sectoral labour immigration policies under Sarkozy’s presidency is particularly 
remarkable in terms of the amount of policy provisions that have been introduced in both the 
legislative and regulatory arenas since 2007. This quantity of policy activity contrasts with all 
previous legislatures in France, where measures concerning immigration in the labour market 
come in short supply and are often limited to sparse administrative rulings rather than more 
politically emblematic changes in parliament. A discussion of the contradictory logics 
underpinning both the political and economic interests –Freeman’s client politics (1995)– falls 
beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the insistence on privileging debatable 
legislative reform to allow for ‘selective immigration’ policies distinguishes Sarkozy from his 
right-wing predecessors’ predilection for less detectable policy changes in this area. This is 
particularly true for instance of the Chirac government in 1986, where the very few measures 
put forward in the area of labour immigration were almost exclusively confined to the 
regulatory domain. 
 
Lastly, placed in historical perspective, the average policy scores obtained by the mainstream 
right on the immigrant integration dimension since 2002 denote the strong ambivalence in 
policy making in this particular area (.03 in 2002-2007 and .12 since 2007). As can be seen 
from Table 2 above, all right-wing governments since 1986 present a larger variance in the 
direction taken by immigrant integration policies, which contrasts with the more homogenous 
pattern of policy preferences found on the left. 
 
This greater amount of variance lifts the veil on some of the dilemma which the moderate 
right has faced over the years, and the array of conflicting external constraints to which these 
parties are subjected. Joppke (1998) argues that European governments have only ‘self-
limited sovereignty’ in areas such as family immigration because of legal-constitutional 
constraints and the moral obligations that postcolonial regimes have towards certain 
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immigrant groups. Attempts by the conservative right to move closer to the exclusionist and 
assimilationist agenda of the populist right are irremediably bound by international 
conventions and domestic courts, not to mention of course European rules. 
 
To close this section, there is one last important conclusion to be drawn from looking at 
changes in policy positioning by the French right over the past ten years. The relatively large 
number of policy measures (N=246) introduced since the election of Chirac in May 2002 
enables us to track those changes over time. These are graphed for both the immigration 
control and immigrant integration areas in Figure 1 below. 
 
From this figure it can be seen that integration policies have been far more variable than those 
put forward in the domain of immigration control. Most importantly, the slope exhibits a 
progressive move towards less expansive immigrant integration measures, with a substantial 
shift after 2010. Let us not that the average direction of all integration policy provisions 
introduced during the first months of 2011 is down to -.67, the lowest score of all French 
governments on that dimension. 
 
That this sharp move towards highly restrictionist measures coincides with the FN’s new lease 
of life by the beginning of 2010 corroborates some of the claims made earlier that immigrant 
integration as a distinct policy area is more vulnerable to policy impact by the populist right in 
France. As will be discussed below, the examination of the polarization in actors’ positions in 
recent parliamentary debates points to the significance of this policy move. 
 
 
[ Figure 1 Here ] 
 
 
This takes us to our last section which concerns the political framing of immigration issues 
and their transportation into mainstream via the legislative process. The influence of the 
populist right does not restrict itself to the area of agenda setting. Its impact is also likely to 
extend to the way immigration as a contentious political issue is defined and constructed by 
partisan actors in the parliamentary arena. 
 
This last part presents the preliminary results of the quantitative relational content analysis 
parliamentary sessions on immigration. In this paper, the findings are restricted to the 1979 
and 2010 debates on the government immigration bills. These already allow to look at some 
of the transformations that have taken place in the political space over time, which can be 
derived from actors’ positioning in the parliamentary arena 7. 
 
In terms first of actor-to-actor relations, polarization proves remarkably stable over time. In 
both the 1979 and 2010 debates, core sentences that have the government as target object 
represent a constant 30.5 per cent of all statements by French MPs (N=823). Criticism of the 
executive culminates naturally in left-wing parties of the parliamentary opposition, at an 
average of -.961 in 1979 and -.873 in 2010. Within the left camp, the Greens in 2010 (-.917) 
have replaced the Communist party of the late 1970s as the most virulent ‘oppositional’ force 
in parliament (-.969 in 1979 down to -.813 in 2010). More notable is perhaps that statements 
disapproving of the government are also found in core sentences by members of the 
parliamentary majority. Internal disunity is particularly noteworthy in the 2010 debate where 
a small group of UMP speakers exhibit a high level of antagonism to the government’s 
16 
 
proposed policies (mean direction of -.694). Most of these backbenchers are representatives of 
the traditional ‘Gaullist’ wing within the UMP close to former President Chirac and former 
PM Villepin, and often come in vehement disagreement with some of the more conservative 
groups in the National Assembly. 
 
In 2010, such ‘opposition from within’ reveals the internal constraints that weigh on policy 
making at agency level and the degree of ideological polarization that exists between the 
various centrist and rightist factions constitutive of the UMP. Looking at who takes part in the 
debate over immigration policy provisions in parliament, there is a disproportionate influence 
by members of the Droite populaire (DP), the rightist national-conservative wing of the 
UMP 8. 
 
If we now turn to mean directions in actor-issue relationships summarized in Table 3 
(N=1,622 core sentences), the analysis suggests a significant change towards more restrictive 
positions in the French party system as a whole, from .116 in 1979 down to -.081 in 2010. 
This first result would lend support to the argument that a ‘right shift’ has occurred in the 
space for elite-level conflict over immigration issues in France since the late 1970s. This 
conceals however an increase in partisan polarization, the apparent shift being due more to the 
centrifugal swing by the right camp. In 1979, right-wing parties have a mean score of -.151 on 
all immigration issues as opposed to -.371 in 2010, whereas the left remains at a steady 
(.581 /.573) over the same time span. On the right of the political continuum, the negative 
repositioning is clearly accentuated in the DP (-.492), but is also visible in the more moderate 
factions of the UMP parliamentary party (-.258). 
 
 
[ Table 3 Here ] 
 
 
Consistent with our previous findings on policy implementation, the data in Table 3 indicate 
that ideological polarization varies across issues of immigration control, immigrant 
integration and labour migration. On the latter economic dimension, there is a significant 
reduction in the ideological distance between parties of the left and those of the right between 
1979 (=.843) and 2010 (=.489). This convergence is largely accounted for by a move 
towards more expansive economic migration policy preferences by parties of the right in 2010 
(mean direction of 0.192) compared with the restrictive views by the RPR/UDF coalition in 
1979 (-.063). 
 
With regard to illegal immigration, the parliamentary data point to fairly similar levels of 
partisan polarization over time (=.843 and =.948 in 1979 and 2010 respectively). The left 
and the right retain very distinctive directional profiles on the issue, with openness being a 
characteristic of the political left and restrictiveness a typical feature of the right. What the 
results suggest is a notable displacement between 1979 and 2010, due to moves towards more 
expansiveness by both the left (.200 up to .531) and the right (-.643 up to -.418). 
 
The most dramatic change is discernible in the area of immigrant integration policies where 
ideological polarization between the left and the right culminates in 2010 (=1.059 as 
opposed to =0.367 in 1979). This strong centrifugal tendency is essentially accounted for by 
the harder line accommodated by parties of the mainstream right, from a relatively expansive 
position in the late 1970s (.233) to a substantially more exclusive one in the recent years (-
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.527). At party level, the contribution by the national-conservative wing of the UMP to this 
repositioning on immigrant integration issues is clear (mean direction of -.642) but the move 
towards obligatory measures concerns the more centrist groups of elites within the 
parliamentary party as well (-.415). In contrast, there is no sizeable change in the stances by 
the left on this distinctive set of issues over time (.600 and .532 in 1979 and 2010 
respectively). 
 
This is consistent with previous findings that the moderate right has noticeably shifted its 
positions on the integration of established immigrants in the past couple of years and has 
endorsed restrictive policies regarding those issues. The analysis of party competition in 
parliamentary debates allows us to take the assertion one step further by looking in more 
detail at the salience of particular issues and the patterns of justification that are employed by 
political actors when taking concrete positions on those issues. 
 
Looking first at the relative salience of issue categories in the 1979 and 2010 parliamentary 
debates shows the increasing salience of immigrant integration issues over time (see Table 4). 
In 1979, the discussion of the government’s bill revolved around legal and illegal immigration 
(40.4 per cent) while about a third of the debate concerned immigrant integration (34.5 per 
cent). Labour market and economic issues occupied about a fifth (19.2 per cent) of the general 
discussion. In 2010, immigrant integration issues dominate the political debate in parliament 
and make up no less than 59.7 per cent of all core sentences by French MPs, while the relative 
size of statements concerning immigration control (both legal and illegal) and labour 
migration is down to 24.9 and 10.8 per cent respectively. 
 
 
[ Table 4 Here ] 
 
 
Moreover, the thematic content of the debate in the specific area of immigrant integration, as 
is revealed by quantitative content analysis, has been transformed in the recent period (figures 
are summarized in italics in Table 4 above). In 2010, issues of citizenship, cultural 
assimilation and national identity profoundly shape the discussion on immigrant integration in 
France, and represent about half (45.1 per cent) of the core sentences in this particular area, as 
opposed to only 20.5 per cent of the positions taken by MPs in 1979. In contrast, a substantial 
size (34 per cent) of the debate on immigrant integration in the late 1970s turned around the 
civil and political rights of foreigners in France, their culture and traditions. By 2010, these 
make up a mere 11.1 per cent of the arguments about how to integrate migrants into French 
society. Lastly, the discussion of the 2010 bill on immigration sees a remarkable emergence 
of issues pertaining to health and welfare. These questions account for a fifth (19.9 per cent) 
of all statements made with regards to immigrant integration, whereas they were totally absent 
in 1979. 
 
This leads us to the argumentative frames mobilized by partisan actors in deploying their 
causal stories of immigration. The data drawn from parliamentary readings allows to explore 
the patterns of justification that are utilized, as well as the propensity for political actors to use 
European integration as a strategic resource to rework specific issues in controversy. Table 5 
contrasts figures for the main categories of frames employed in the 1979 and 2010 
parliamentary debates. The relative proportions of EU-related arguments are summarized in 
the bottom rows of the table. 
18 
 
 
 
[ Table 5 Here ] 
 
 
The data in Table 5 point to significant changes in the general argumentative structure of 
immigration debates over time. In the late 1970s, parliamentary discussions were mostly 
framed pragmatically (42.7 per cent) and, to a lesser extent, would resort to moral contentions 
relative to general universal principles (25.9 per cent). The more recent period sees a sharp 
decrease in both sets of frames down to 30.1 and 13.8 per cent respectively. By 2010, the 
legal framing of immigration issues has grown in importance (30.1 per cent). This must of 
course be placed in the context of the European integration process: whilst references to the 
European Union are quasi absent from immigration debates in the late 1970s, EU-related 
positions make up 14.2 per cent of all statements by French MPs in 2010. Recall that one 
important objective of the draft bill on immigration, integration, and nationality of March 
2010 was to transpose three European Union directives into French legislation 9. 
 
It is interesting to note that the European framing of immigration is more frequent on the right 
side of the parliamentary assembly (16.4 per cent compared with 9.3 per cent on the left). This 
is commensurate with the general assumption that policy preferences by the French 
conservatives are congruent with the common European agenda on immigration. In return, the 
necessity to conform to the European integration process provides a useful set of 
argumentative tools to French policy makers when introducing new legislation. The vast 
majority (77.4 per cent) of EU-related statements by right-wing speakers in the National 
Assembly use the legal frame in reference to the three aforementioned directives, as well as to 
other sets of European rules. 
 
Lastly, there is a notable increase in the overall share of identity-based frames (from 3.5 in 
1979 up to 18.9 per cent in 2010). With respect to the most recent period, this pattern of 
‘cultural’ justification is over-represented in the line of reasoning by right-wing MPs (23.8 per 
cent) and culminates in members of the DP (31.1 per cent). More importantly, identity-based 
frames are more often resorted to by right-wing actors in the area of immigrant integration 
(35.9 per cent) and are almost exclusively restricted to domestic aspects, with very few 
mentions of the EU. 
 
To conclude, combined with the evidence of more stringent policies in the area of immigrant 
integration, these empirical results substantiate general claims made about the ‘new politics’ 
of immigration by the moderate right in France since 2007. The data clearly indicate that 
elite-level conflicts over immigration have become more salient in 2010 than they were in the 
late 1970s, although the analysis evidently needs to be extended to all intermediary stages in 
the development of immigration laws over the whole period in order to identify trends behind 
such an increase in prominence. 
 
In the course of the 2010 debate, questions such as cultural assimilation, national identity, the 
loss of French citizenship or the fight against marriage fraud have topped the legislative 
agenda of the right. This comes in line of course with the general framing of public 
controversies as would be for instance revealed by contextualized media coverage analysis. 
Some of those changes would have been anticipated after the launch of the highly criticized 
‘national identity’ debate by the government in October 2009 or the controversial speech 
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made by Sarkozy on immigration and crime during the summer of 2010 in Grenoble. 
Transposed into the parliamentary arena, disputes over immigrant integration have seen a 
considerable increase in party polarization, mostly due to a strong directional shift towards 
more radical stances by parties of the right. The weight of identity-based assertions together 
with their independence from a more general European agenda on immigration bear testimony 
to the symbolic importance allotted to reframing immigrant integration issues both culturally 
and domestically. 
 
The analysis of actors’ positions in the general public debate provides therefore further 
empirical evidence of the ideological re-orientation by the UMP on some of the core 
foundations of the populist right agenda in France. That this transformation is particularly 
visible in 2010 cannot of course be entirely dissociated from the process of electoral 
realignment that has occurred on the right pole of French politics in the regional elections of 
March 2010, which gave important gains to the FN at the expenses of the ruling UMP 
majority 10. 
 
A similar hypothesis is supported by our results pointing to the emergence of a specific set of 
mostly domestic issues relating to immigrants’ access to healthcare and welfare provisions. In 
2010, a number of legislative amendments to the draft governmental Bill were introduced by 
members of the DP as an attempt to strengthen the legislation on those two signature issues of 
the populist right. Remarkably, these parliamentary initiatives coincided with the 
development of an aggressive welfare chauvinist campaign by the FN against existing public 
health and pension allowances granted to foreigners in France. 
 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
Based on the empirical case-study of the political development of the FN in France, this paper 
set out the objective to advance our understanding of populist right impact. Notwithstanding 
what we learn from studies of other crucial political venues such as party manifestos, the mass 
media or electoral campaigns, the main focus of this contribution has been on party 
competition in the legislative arena, with a particular emphasis on policy issues constitutive of 
the cultural axis that has been central to the electoral appeal by the FN since the mid-1980s. 
 
The systematic analysis of time series data for policy change puts in evidence the 
asymmetrical propensity for partisan actors to endorse the political agenda publicized by the 
populist right. Partisanship does matter, and the influence exerted by the FN is not of the same 
nature nor magnitude whether one considers policies pursued by parties to the left of the 
political spectrum or by those to the right of it. 
 
These results provide important empirical evidence for the partisan ‘pendulum’ swing that has 
been identified by policy analysts in France, whereby most adjustments in immigration 
policies have consisted of each camp undoing the changes made by its predecessor. As 
suggested, however, by Lochak (1997), this view of a quasi-perpetual swing in immigration 
policies can be partly misleading as the pendulum never quite balances all the way back to 
where it originally was. More importantly, as a consequence of the longer period of the right 
in office since 2002, there are cumulative effects whereby restrictive changes come as an 
addition to already restrictive measures. This was the case for instance with the recent 
20 
 
2010/2011 provisional Bill on immigration which built on some of the substantial policy 
moves already entailed by the 2003, 2006 and 2007 immigration laws. 
 
With respect to the French left, the resilience of a broad policy agenda of cultural liberalism is 
remarkable across all periods of government, irrespective of the electoral weight or popularity 
of the FN. Similar trends towards a new left transformation and the cultural modernization of 
French society are found in all left-wing governments since the early 1980s. This effort 
culminates during the five years of the Jospin ‘plural left’ in office due to the ‘greener’ make 
up the parliamentary support for the government and the concomitant development of a 
framework of social modernization at European level. 
 
Parties of the left in France have not abdicated from their ‘natural’ ideology in determining 
immigration policies. This can be judged by the intensity and direction in the legislative 
activity around issues of social cohesion, anti-discriminations, family reunion, citizenship 
acquisition or the regularization of undocumented migrants. The liberal agenda is most visible 
in the area of immigrant integration where the libertarian-universalistic preferences by the 
French left stand in firm antagonism to the culturally protectionist and strict assimilationist 
positions by the FN. The salience of the left-right cleavage is equally perceptible in the more 
expansive policy positions by the left in relation to immigration control and inflows of new 
immigrants, although there have been adjustments towards more restrictive policies in the late 
1980s and, in less visible manner, in the late 1990s, which can arguably be construed as 
strategic responses to the electoral pressure by the populist right. 
 
A whole different reality is found of course to the right of the political system, where 
contamination by the populist right is more predictable. The time series analysis in this paper 
suggests that right-wing governments are more prone to accommodate policies that resonate 
with some of the core features of the populist right agenda. Such preferences cannot of course 
be attributed to the sole political influence by the FN. As Bale (2008) rightly points out, 
conservative parties have every good reason to be preoccupied with immigration, and it is 
their raison d’être to defend the socio-economic and cultural status quo. 
 
Put in historical perspective, the tightening of immigration control policies, which is often 
interpreted as a key response by the mainstream right to the populist challenge, was already 
well under way during the late 1970s at a time when the FN had not yet achieved electoral 
relevance. The policy analysis points to the symbolic importance of the new immigration 
legislation introduced by the centre-right government in 1979. Concurrently the longitudinal 
examination of actors’ positions in parliamentary discussions shows that the French right had 
tougher stances on issues of illegal or labour immigration in the late 1970s when compared 
with the more recent period. 
 
This is not to say evidently that parties of the moderate right have been immune to the 
external pressure by the FN. The hard line on immigration control inaugurated under the 
Giscard presidency was clearly accentuated during both the 1986-1988 and 1993-1997 
periods of UDF/RPR government after the FN made important electoral gains. Parties of the 
right have proved particularly susceptible to the impact by their populist challenger in other 
important areas of policy making. This is true of the co-optation of the broader populist 
agenda on immigration and crime by the RPR/UDF coalition from the mid-1980s onwards, as 
revealed in the higher contingent of immigration and, more specifically, security laws in the 
post-FN emergence stage of the party system. Looking back at the 1986 experience of the 
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French right returning to power, it is first and foremost in the formation of a strong law-and-
order agenda by the Chirac government that the influence of the FN manifests itself. 
 
From a wider policy angle, it is also clear that a damaging collateral effect of the electoral 
success of the populist right has been to hinder the expansion of policies of cultural and 
family modernization such as those introduced by the centre-right majority during the 1970s. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the moderate right has abandoned the cultural liberal 
agenda to prioritize social conservative and authoritarian policies directed at immigration and 
crime. This conservative backlash within the French right is further evidenced by the policy 
moves towards cultural protectionism in the area of immigrant integration throughout the 
1980s and, most dramatically, the 1990s. By 1993, the stringent civic integration legislation 
by the right comes in striking contrast with the more integrative policies introduced during the 
Giscard era. The content analysis of political debates over immigration in the late 1970s 
indicates simultaneously that questions of immigrants’ civic and cultural rights would be 
given substantial attention by centre-right policy makers, but have since disappeared from the 
bulk of the conservative legislative agenda. 
 
The findings for the more recent period of right-wing incumbency since 2002 provide 
empirical evidence to corroborate the assumption of continuity in the ‘reactionary’ profile 
characteristic of the RPR/UDF bloc in the 1990s. The unrelenting salience of the populist 
right agenda is visible in the accumulation of immigration and security laws throughout the 
2000s under both Chirac and Sarkozy’s presidential terms. The policy analysis points also to 
the persistence of strict immigration control policies and the political use of high profile 
immigration legislation as a strategic communicational device to send a message of firmness 
to voters, which contrasts with more balanced policy moves in the less publicized domain of 
regulatory power. 
 
Overall, when contrasted with previous right-wing experiences of addressing the populist 
agenda, the general response articulated by the UMP after 2002 does not show any major 
departure from the reactions observed in the 1980s and the 1990s. Nor does it reveal any 
substantial differences in the average direction of immigration policy positioning across the 
Chirac and Sarkozy’s presidencies. In this respect, the results in this paper lead perhaps to a 
more nuanced appraisal of the proposition that the moderate right in France has undergone a 
process of deep programmatic revision of immigration policies under Sarkozy’s leadership. 
Contrary to common perceptions, this analysis finds a small centripetal policy move in the 
area of immigrant integration in the first stage of the Sarkozy’s presidency, together with a 
partial reintroduction of the social modernization agenda that had almost completely fallen 
into oblivion during the previous periods of right-wing incumbency of the 1990s. 
 
There are equally important implications for the shape and ideological polarization of 
immigration policy positions in the party system. Looking at substantive policy making over 
the long period, there is a relatively modest level of policy polarization between mainstream 
parties in the French political space. In opposition to the chauvinist economic positions by the 
FN, mainstream policy convergence is most evident in the area of labour migration where 
partisan differences are the least perceptible and point to a common recognition of the 
continuous demand for migrant labour in France’s labour market. The moderate right in 
particular has moved away from the restrictive stance taken by the Chirac and Barre’s 
governments in the 1970s. This repositioning is consistent with both a classic clients-politics 
hypothesis and the setting of a shared European agenda for economic migration since the 
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early 2000s. What is revealed by the empirical data is the decreased policy salience of labour 
migration throughout the 1990s –with all governments carefully avoiding the issue in the 
policy making process– before the question was given new publicity and reframed into 
‘selective immigration’ by Sarkozy in the mid-2000s. 
 
To continue with policy polarization, in the long run, neither the moderate right on immigrant 
integration nor the left on immigration control are found on the opposite side of the policy 
continuum but rather in a mean position adjacent to zero. This can be somewhat regarded as a 
consequence of the greater variance found in ‘adverse’ policy preferences by each political 
camp over time. Policy revision tends to fluctuate more in areas where natural partisan 
inclinations are challenged. This is particularly striking in left-wing periods of government 
where the amount of policy variance on the control dimension is more than twice that of 
immigrant integration. A similar conclusion applies in the opposite direction to parties of the 
right with regard to their policies of integration, albeit less markedly. 
 
These results highlight the different political dilemmas faced by partisan actors in France in 
their definition of immigration policies over time. The French left has never endorsed the 
‘open border’ political programme put forward by a number of NGOs, and has chosen instead 
to give priority to immigrant integration policies, which can be reconciled with its traditional 
egalitarian agenda of social cohesion. The move towards libertarian-universalistic positions 
together with a relative reluctance to engage in more stringent immigration control policies 
can be seen as antagonistic with the social demands that emanate from the traditional 
working-class and lower salariat constituencies of the left, and might therefore have 
participated of their electoral dealignment. 
 
As for parties of the mainstream right’s moderate score on integration issues, the emphasis 
must be put on the array of pressures that surround policy making and might have prevented 
the French right to preempt further the cultural protectionist agenda of the FN. The data in this 
paper shed light on the tension that exists between a wide range of often contradictory 
economic, social, legal or political objectives and interests. At the level of intra-party 
competition, the analysis has highlighted the role by the centrist groups of elites within the 
UMP in promoting a temperate response to the some of the more radical positions advocated 
by the national-conservative wing of the party in the parliamentary arena. Simultaneously it is 
necessary to incorporate external policy making constraints consecutive to the development of 
a widespread body of international legal norms. That for instance more liberal legislative 
measures have been brought back to the forefront of the French policy agenda since the early 
2000s owes probably more to the moderating effect by the expanding European framework of 
equality and rights since the mid-1990s than to a genuine change in domestic policy 
positioning by the UMP. 
 
Finally, one important conclusion to be drawn from the empirical policy data is the 
recognizable progression by the UMP towards more restrictive integration procedures, 
together with the reemergence of a strong assimilationist agenda of civic integration and 
exclusive citizenry in 2010/11. This sharp policy move is clearly apparent in the identity-
based positions taken by right-wing actors in the 2010 parliamentary debate that was 
dominated by the FN proprietary issues of loss of nationality, marriage fraud, immigrant 
welfare or access to healthcare. The distance between the partisan positions of the left and the 
right has grown much larger since the late 1970s, due mostly to this radical shift by parties of 
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the moderate right. And this dramatic increase in party polarization concerns predominantly 
the area of immigrant integration. 
 
As the 2012 presidential campaign approaches, such accentuation in policy preferences by the 
French right is concomitant with both the electoral revival of the FN under the new leadership 
of Marine Le Pen, and Sarkozy’s record low levels of presidential popularity 11. Yet the data 
in this paper reveal the depth of the policy revision that has been undertaken by the moderate 
right in the most recent period. The continuation in 2011 of a passionate debate over 
immigration, Islam or the failure of integration lends further support to the contention that the 
UMP is currently abandoning the more ‘middle-of-the-road’ policies that were implemented 
during the first years of the Chirac and Sarkozy presidencies. 
 
Furthermore, the new highly restrictive measures presented by the government in the area of 
labour migration in May 2011 mark an abrupt u-turn from the more expansive legislation put 
forward since 2003, and as such a significant alteration to the policy profile of the UMP 12. 
Combined with the inflation in security laws since 2003, the pursuit of strict immigration 
control policies and the preference for increasingly more drastic immigrant integration 
procedures, this latest policy move towards economic chauvinism would seem to complete the 
policy radicalization of the UMP, and could lead eventually to an authentic ‘populist right 
moment’ in the history of the French right. 
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Tables and figures 
 
 
 
Table 1. Immigration, law-and-order and cultural liberalism laws by legislature, parliamentary 
majority and pre-FN period: 1974-2011 
   Number of Laws (%) 
Parliamentary Legislature Majority % FN(d) Immigr. 
Law and 
order 
FN 
Agenda 
Cultural 
liberalism All 
-V/VI-Giscard(a) (1974-1981) Right 0.7 4 (0.8) 2 (0.4) 6 (1.2) 19 (3.7) 516 
-VII-Mitterrand (1981-1986) Left 0.4 5 (1.4) 2 (0.6) 7 (2.0) 17 (4.9) 348 
-VIII-Chirac (1986-1988) Right(b) 9.6 1 (0.8) 7 (5.6) 8 (6.3) 3 (2.4) 126 
-IX-Mitterrand (1988-1993) Left 14.4 7 (2.5) 3 (1.1) 10 (3.6) 12 (4.3) 281 
-X-Balladur/Juppé (1993-1997) Right(b) 12.4 6 (2.6) 8 (3.5) 14 (6.1) 3 (1.3) 230 
-XI-Jospin (1997-2002) Left(b) 14.9 2 (0.9) 7 (3.2) 9 (4.1) 31 (14.0) 221 
-XII-Chirac (2002-2007)(c) Right 16.9 8 (3.4) 9 (3.9) 16 (6.9) 13 (5.6) 233 
-XIII-Sarkozy (2007-)(c) Right 10.4 6 (2.9) 12 (5.8) 17 (8.2) 9 (4.3) 207 
        
Partisanship Left  14 (1.6) 12 (1.4) 26 (3.1) 60 (7.1) 850 
 Right  25 (1.9) 38 (2.9) 61 (4.6) 47 (3.6) 1312 
        
Period Pre-FN  9 (1.0) 4 (0.5) 13 (1.5) 36 (4.2) 864 
 Post-FN  30 (2.3) 46 (3.5) 74 (5.7) 71 (5.5) 1,298 
        
 All  39 (1.8) 50 (2.3) 87 (4.0) 107 (4.9) 2,162 
a
 From May 1974 to May 1981 (excluding the beginning of the Fifth legislature) 
b Cohabitation period: partisanship is derived from parliamentary majority; 1995/1997: Jacques Chirac’s presidency 
c Discrepancies in the FN agenda’s total number of laws are due to the coding of two laws (2006 & 2008) relative to border 
controls and the fight against crime on both the security and immigration dimensions 
d
 Percentage of the national vote for the FN at the beginning of the legislature (presidential score in 1988, 2002 and 2007; 
parliamentary otherwise). 
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Table 2. Mean direction of immigration policy provisions: 1974-2011 
 Policy provisions 
Parliamentary Legislature Majority % FN(c) 
Control 
(N=314) 
Integration 
(N=277) 
Labour 
(N=124) 
-V/VI-Giscard(a) (1974-1981) Right 0.7 -.64 .55 -.67 
   (24) (23) (12) 
   .790 .858 .778 
-VII-Mitterrand (1981-1986) Left 0.4 .33 .83 .89 
   (19) (36) (18) 
   .970 .568 .471 
-VIII-Chirac (1986-1988) Right(b) 9.6 -1.00 .29 1.00 
   (19) (14) (9) 
   .000 .994 .000 
-IX-Mitterrand (1988-1993) Left 14.4 -.21 .93 .67 
   (38) (29) (12) 
   .991 .371 .778 
-X-Balladur/Juppé (1993-1997) Right(b) 12.4 -.78 -.47 1.00 
   (55) (30) (4) 
   .629 .900 .000 
-XI-Jospin (1997-2002) Left(b) 14.9 .43 .89 1.00 
   (21) (37) (4) 
   .926 .458 .000 
-XII-Chirac (2002-2007) Right 16.9 -.56 .03 1.00 
   (63) (58) (19) 
   .838 1.008 .000 
-XIII-Sarkozy (2007-) Right 10.4 -.52 .12 1.00 
   (75) (50) (46) 
   .860 1.003 .000 
Partisanship Left  .10 .88 .82 
 
  (80) (103) (34) 
 
  1.001 .471 .576 
 
Right  -.64 .06 .78 
 
  (234) (174) (90) 
 
  .769 1.001 .632 
Period Pre-FN  -.20 .72 .27 
 
  (40) (57) (30) 
 
  .992 .701 .980 
 Post-FN  -.49 .27 .96 
   (274) (220) (94) 
   .874 .964 .290 
 All Mean -.46 .36 .79 
  N (314) (277) (124) 
  St.dev. .889 .935 .615 
a
 From May 1974 to May 1981 (excluding the beginning of the Fifth legislature) 
b Cohabitation period: partisanship is derived from parliamentary majority; 1995/1997: Jacques Chirac’s presidency 
c
 Percentage of the national vote for the FN at the beginning of the legislature (presidential score in 1988, 2002 and 2007; 
parliamentary otherwise). 
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Table 3. Salience and positions of actors in parliamentary immigration debates: 1979-2010 
 1979(a) 2010(b) 
Target Actor Position (Mean) 
Salience 
(%) 
Std. 
Dev. Actor 
Position 
(Mean) 
Salience 
(%) 
Std. 
Dev. 
All 
immigration 
issues 
PC 0.658 14.9 0.648 PC 0.514 5.3 0.492 
PS 0.527 21.6 0.722 Greens 0.721 2.5 0.280 
UDF -0.173 44.3 0.806 PS 0.570 22.9 0.465 
RPR -0.102 19.2 0.797 Modem/NC -0.167 1.3 0.727 
 
    UMP -0.258 35.3 0.641 
     UMP/DP(c) -0.492 30.8 0.571 
     DLR(d) -0.660 1.8 0.553 
Left 0.581 36.5 0.692 Left 0.573 30.7 0.459 
Right -0.151 63.5 0.802 Right -0.371 69.3 0.622 
 0.732    0.943   
 All 0.116 (N=255) 0.840 All -0.081 (N=1,367) 0.723 
Illegal 
Immigration 
PC 0.500 5.5 0.707 PC 0.462 4.9 0.477 
PS 0.000 8.2 1.095 Greens 0.500 1.5 0.000 
UDF -0.716 60.3 0.449 PS 0.552 18.1 0.464 
RPR -0.474 26.0 0.696 Modem/NC -0.357 2.6 0.626 
  
   UMP -0.288 39.2 0.610 
     UMP/DP(c) -0.543 30.6 0.462 
     DLR(d) -0.875 3.0 0.231 
Left 0.200 13.7 0.948 Left 0.531 24.5 0.449 
Right -0.643 86.3 0.542 Right -0.418 75.5 0.562 
 0.843    0.948   
 All -0.527 (N=73) 0.671 All -0.185 (N=265) 0.674 
Immigrant 
integration 
PC 0.846 14.8 0.427 PC 0.500 4.7 0.419 
PS 0.500 36.4 0.729 Greens 0.740 3.1 0.293 
UDF 0.204 30.7 0.787 PS 0.511 23.0 0.493 
RPR 0.281 18.2 0.729 Modem/NC -0.500 0.4 0.866 
  
   UMP -0.415 35.2 0.594 
     UMP/DP(c) -0.642 32.5 0.456 
     DLR(d) -0.750 1.2 0.485 
Left 0.600 51.1 0.670 Left 0.532 30.8 0.470 
Right 0.233 48.9 0.758 Right -0.527 69.2 0.544 
 0.367    1.059   
 All 0.420 (N=88) 0.734 All -0.202 (N=816) 0.715 
Labour 
migration 
and the 
economy 
PC 0.824 34.7 0.498 PC 0.531 10.9 0.644 
PS 0.688 16.3 0.593 Greens 0.667 2.0 0.288 
UDF 0.056 36.7 0.838 PS 0.730 34.0 0.338 
RPR -0.417 12.2 0.736 Modem/NC -0.750 1.4 0.353 
  
   UMP 0.244 27.9 0.603 
     UMP/DP(c) 0.328 19.7 0.735 
     DLR(d) -0.500 4.1 0.547 
Left 0.780 51.0 0.522 Left 0.681 46.9 0.428 
Right -0.063 49.0 0.825 Right 0.192 53.1 0.689 
 0.843    0.489   
 All 0.367 (N=49) 0.802 All 0.422 (N=147) 0.629 
a
 Loi n°80-9 du 10 janvier 1980 portant modification de l'ordonnance no 45-2658 du 2 novembre 1945 relative aux conditions 
d'entrée et de séjour en France des étrangers (Loi Bonnet) 
b
 Projet de loi relatif à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à la nationalité, n°2400, déposé le 31 mars 2010 ; provisional results 
for 65 per cent of all core sentences in the first reading of the Bill 
c UMP/DP=UMP Droite Populaire ; d DLR=Debout la République (Right-Wing Eurosceptic, 2 MPs) 
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Table 4. Issue salience in parliamentary immigration debates: 1979-2010 
 1979(a) 2010(b) 
Issue Salience % Salience % 
- Illegal immigration 28.6 19.4 
- Legal migration and asylum 11.8 5.5 
- Immigrant integration 34.5 59.7 
- Civil rights, discriminations, immigrant culture and traditions 34.0 11.1 
- Citizenship, naturalization, assimilation, national identity 20.5 45.1 
- Regularizations of undocumented migrants 18.2 4.8 
- Crime, law-and-order, violence, double punishment 11.4 7.9 
- Family reunion, marriage 9.1 7.5 
- Health and welfare 2.3 19.9 
- Islam and polygamy –– 2.0 
- Other 4.5 1.7 
 100.0 100.0 
- Labour migration and the economy 19.2 10.8 
- Other (general, unspecified) 5.9 4.7 
 100.0 100.0 
All(c) (N=255) (N=1,367) 
a
 Loi n°80-9 du 10 janvier 1980 portant modification de l'ordonnance no 45-2658 du 2 novembre 1945 relative aux conditions 
d'entrée et de séjour en France des étrangers (Loi Bonnet) 
b
 Projet de loi relatif à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à la nationalité, n°2400, déposé le 31 mars 2010 ; provisional results 
for 65 per cent of all core sentences in the first reading of the Bill 
c
 All actor-issue core sentences. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Partisan framing of parliamentary immigration debates: 1979-2010 
 1979(a) 2010(b) 
Frames Left Right All Left Right All 
-Report, statistics, int. compar. 6.5 7.4 7.1 7.4 7.0 7.1 
-Pragmatic, utilitarian 46.2 40.7 42.7 39.3 26.1 30.1 
-Identity-based 3.2 3.7 3.5 8.1 23.8 18.9 
-Moral-universal 33.3 21.6 25.9 23.3 9.5 13.8 
-Legal-rational 10.8 26.5 20.8 21.9 33.7 30.1 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% EU-related       
-No 97.8 98.8 98.4 90.7 83.6 85.8 
-Yes 2.2 1.2 1.6 9.3 16.4 14.2 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
All(c) (N=93) (N=162) (N=255) (N=420) (N=947) (N=1,367) 
a
 Loi n°80-9 du 10 janvier 1980 portant modification de l'ordonnance no 45-2658 du 2 novembre 1945 relative aux conditions 
d'entrée et de séjour en France des étrangers (Loi Bonnet) 
b
 Projet de loi relatif à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à la nationalité, n°2400, déposé le 31 mars 2010 ; provisional results 
for 65 per cent of all core sentences in the first reading of the Bill 
c
 All actor-issue core sentences. 
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Figure 1. Yearly average scores(a) for immigration control and immigrant integration policy 
provisions: 2003-2011 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 Since the mid-1980s, the strong anti-tax and small-state demagoguery has been for example a crucial 
constitutive element of the FN programmatic appeal to the petty-bourgeois electoral constituency. 
2
 Cases where international treaties and agreements are brought to the parliament for approval are excluded from 
calculations. 
3
 Loi n°80-9 du 10 janvier 1980 portant modification de l'ordonnance no 45-2658 du 2 novembre 1945 relative 
aux conditions d'entrée et de séjour en France des étrangers (Loi Bonnet) ; Projet de loi relatif à l'immigration, à 
l'intégration et à la nationalité, n°2400, déposé le 31 mars 2010. In the 1979 data, there are a total of 368 core 
sentences in both the first and second reading of the immigration Bill across 4 sessions in Parliament in 
May/June and December. In 2010, the first two-thirds (65 per cent) of the first reading of the provisional Bill 
represent a total of 2,077 core sentences. In 2010, the debate is spanning 14 sessions in September/October 2010, 
to which one must add another 7 sessions for the second reading of the law in March 2011. 
4
 The Fifth legislature started in April 1973 under the presidency of Georges Pompidou. Yet, the analysis here is 
restricted to the period covering both the end of the Fifth and whole of Sixth legislatures under the Giscard 
d’Estaing presidency. No significant piece of legislation was passed during the short interval spanning 1973/74 
that is left out by this analysis. 
5
 This was the case for instance of the Equal opportunity law of February 2005, or the December 2004 law that 
created the High Authority to fight against discriminations and promote equality (HALDE), which both fell 
within the framework of the European Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC). 
6
 It must be noted that this strong restrictive stance in the late 1970s would have been further accentuated under 
the provisions of the abandoned 1979 draft bill on immigrant guest workers, which planned for a number of 
stringent measures to control labour migration such as the loss of residency permit in case of unemployment, or 
the introduction of regional quotas for migrant workers. 
7
 Due to limitations of time, the analysis of the 2010 debate is restricted here to the first 65 per cent the first 
reading only. 
8
 Statements by members of the DP represent a total of 42.8 per cent of all UMP core sentences during the first 
reading of the provisional immigration bill. By way of contrast, the 42 MPs officially affiliated with the DP 
make up a total of 13.4 per cent of all 313 members of the UMP parliamentary party. Moreover, two of the most 
prominent leaders of the DP acted as official recorder and law committee’s spokesman respectively during the 
2010 sessions on immigration. 
9
 Namely the directive on “return” of December 2008, (Directive 2008/115/EC on Common Standards and 
Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals), the “blue card” directive 
of May 2009, (Directive 2009-50/EC on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third Country Nationals for 
the Purpose of Highly Qualified Employment) and that on “sanctions” of June 2009, (Directive 2009/52/EC 
Providing for Minimum Standards on Sanctions and Measures Against Employers of Illegally Staying Third-
Country Nationals). 
10
 In 2010, the FN regained substantial ground in the March regional elections where it received 11.4 per cent of 
the vote nationwide. Significant gains were made in the second round in the party’s strongholds of 
Mediterranean and Northern France where Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen polled 23.8 and 22.2 per cent 
respectively. 
11
 Capitalizing on the surge in popularity for Marine Le Pen, the FN made an impressive breakthrough in the 
March 2011 cantonal elections with 15.1 per cent of the national vote and an average progression of about 
10 percentage points between the two rounds. Since January 2011, most opinion polls have pointed to a 
significant rise in popular support for the FN candidate at about 18-23 per cent in the forthcoming presidential 
contest. During the Spring, a number of polls put Marine Le Pen ahead of the UMP candidate in the first round 
of the election. 
12
 Interior Minister Guéant launched a debate over the need to reduce immigration to the labour market due to 
the economic downturn consecutive to the 2008 financial crisis. The controversy was further fuelled by Labour 
Minister Bertrand who made a rapprochement between immigration and unemployment. On 31 May 2011, the 
government issued a first circular that restrained considerably the conditions for admission of third-country 
nationals to employment in France. 
